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Judicial Remedies under EC Competition Law: Complex Issues arising 
from the “Modernisation” Process 
 
 





Article 230 EC allows any natural or legal person to “institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a 
decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former”.1 
Private parties thus frequently rely on this provision to challenge acts adopted by the 
European Commission (hereafter the “Commission”) in accordance with the powers granted 
to it in the field of competition law. While this particular subject has generated extensive 
scholarly analysis,2 the last decade of reforms of EC competition law – often cited as the 
“modernisation” process – makes it particularly necessary to re-examine this topic.3 Two 
major developments in the field of competition law give rise to novel and complex questions 
with regard to judicial review pursuant to Article 230 EC. 
 
First, the reforms introduced by virtue of the modernisation of the implementation of EC 
competition rules have generated a proliferation of new acts whose legal character (and 
therefore by implication the possibility to challenge these new acts before the European Court 
of Justice – hereafter, the “ECJ”  – and the Court of First Instance – hereafter, the “CFI”) is 
not necessarily clear. This is the case, for example, of the multitude of soft law instruments 
(notices, guidelines, etc.) which the Commission adopted with a view to clarifying its 
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1
 See Article 230 EC: “The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts [...] of the Commission [...] intended 
to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a 
Member State, the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to 
its application, or misuse of powers [...]. Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute 
proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a 
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former. The 
proceedings [...] shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to 
the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case 
may be”. It should be observed that the scope of Article 230 EC is neither limited to the Commission’s acts, nor 
to the competition law field. 
2
 For the most part the studies carried out in relation to annulment actions are general studies that do not 
specifically focus on competition law. Several commentators do, however, devote a substantial part of their 
analysis to the competition law field. See the various studies cited in the footnotes below and, above all, P. 
Duffy, “Quelles réformes pour le recours en annulation”, (1995) 5-6, Cahiers de Droit Européen 553. M. 
Canedo, “L’intérêt à agir dans le recours en annulation en droit communautaire”, (2000) 3 Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Européen 452. See also the various books on EC competition law procedure which raise these questions 
and, in particular, C. Kerse and N. Khan, EC Antitrust Procedure, 5th ed., Thomson – Sweet & Maxwell, 2005; 
L. Ortiz Blanco, EC Competition Procedure, Clarendon Press – Oxford, 1996. 
3
 See D. Geradin, ed., Modernisation and Enlargement: Two Major Challenges for EC Competition Law, 
Intersentia, 2004. The founding text of the modernisation process is Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 
2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (2003) 
O.J. L 1/1. In the area of merger control, one can also mention Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings, (2004) O.J. L 24. 
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decisional practice,4 as well as new binding acts envisaged by Regulation 1/2003 such as 
findings of inapplicability and decisions to remove a case from a National Competition 
Authority.  
 
Second, the increased emphasis on the use of economic analysis following the successive 
reforms of the rules pertaining to horizontal and vertical agreements and merger control has 
transformed competition law into a technically complex subject matter whereby economists 
are stealing a lead over lawyers.5 The corollary of this development could be to limit the 
scope of judicial review exercised by generalist EC and national courts. Indeed, faced with 
having to make complex evaluations involving the weighing up of anti-competitive 
restrictions and efficiency gains, the generalist judge could quickly find himself lost. 
Therefore, the more opaque and complex a particular case is, the wider the Commission’s 
discretion in its decision making becomes. Certain recent judgments of the CFI concerning 
the annulment of Commission prohibition decisions in merger control, however, put this 
danger into perspective.6 
 
Apart from the above-mentioned developments, it is equally worth highlighting the 
proliferation of litigation running in parallel to annulment actions. Such litigation calls for, 
first and foremost, a re-examination and revision of the fines imposed by the Commission 
under Articles 81 and 82 EC.7 Subsequent to successful annulment actions, such litigation 
also encompasses actions for compensation of the losses incurred by the firm(s) subjected to 
unlawful Commission decisions. The recent case Holcim v. Commission or the request lodged 
by Mytravel after the Airtours judgment illustrate the development of such litigation in the 
field of competition law.8 
 
Against this background, the developments that follow intend to provide a critical analysis of 
annulment actions against Commission decisions in the field of competition law in the 
aftermath of the modernisation process. This study is made up of seven parts. Part II identifies 
those acts that can be the subject of an annulment action within the meaning of Article 230 
EC. Part III reviews and analyses the rules laying down who is entitled to initiate an 
annulment action. Part IV recalls the modalities for an annulment action. Part V evokes the 
parallel actions (revision of fines) and subsequent actions for indemnity following an 
annulment action. Part VI evaluates the effectiveness of the Community annulment action 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, the Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters), (2004) O.J. C 101/78; Commission 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty, (2004) O.J. C 101/97. See also D. Geradin, ed., 
supra note 3. 
5
 Commission Regulation 2658/2000 of 29 November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
categories of specialisation agreements, (2000) O.J. L 304/3; Commission Regulation 2659/2000 of 29 
November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development 
agreements, (2000) O.J. L 304/7; Commission Regulation 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices,  (1999) O.J. L 336 21; 
Commission notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, (2000) O.J. C 291; Commission Notice Guidelines on 
the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements, (2001) O.J. C 3/2; 
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, (2004) O.J. C 31/5.  
6
 See Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-258; Case T-310/01, Schneider Electric v. 
Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-4071; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval v. Commission, [2002] E.C.R. II-4381. 
7
 See on this, D. Geradin and D. Henry, “The EC Fining Policy for Violations of Competition Law: An 
Empirical Review of the Commission’s Decisional Practice and the Community Courts’ Judgments”, (2005) 
GCLC Working Paper 03/05 available at http://gclc.coleurop.be/. 
8
 See Case T-28/03, Holcim AG v. Commission, not yet reported and Request, Case T-212/03, MyTravel v. 
Commission. 
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procedure in the light of the principles laid down by the CFI and ECJ as regards judicial 
review. Part VII provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
II.  Acts that can be challenged within the context of EC competition law post 
Modernisation 
 
The modernisation of EC competition law has given rise to new categories of act whose 
“challengeable” characteristics within the context of annulment actions require examination. 
To determine whether those new acts are challengeable, it is useful to give a brief reminder of 
the principles identified in the case-law (1). The different acts envisaged by Regulation 
1/2003 are then examined in the light of these principles (2). 
 
1.   Establishing whether an act is challengeable within the meaning of Article 230 EC 
 
Three conditions must be satisfied in order for an act to be the subject of an annulment action. 
First, the act must have been adopted by a Community institution.9 With the modernisation 
process having come to a close, this condition allows for a distinction to be made between 
those acts adopted by the Commission which do fall within the scope of Article 230 EC, and 
those decisions and judgments of national competition authorities and courts which do not. 
This condition further lays down that those acts adopted by either the consultative committee, 
which is composed of Member State representatives, or the network of competition authorities 
created following the adoption of Article 1/2003 fall outside the scope of a possible 
annulment action. 
 
Second, only those acts producing legal effects on a person’s situation and affecting that 
person in an adverse manner can be challenged on the basis of Article 230 EC.10 The origins 
of this condition can be found in the ERTA judgment whereby an annulment action is 
permitted against “all acts adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which 
are intended to have legal effects”.11 Commission decisions within the framework of the 
implementation of competition law produce such an effect.12 The ERTA case-law has, 
however, allowed for a broadening of the scope of annulment actions so as to include those 
acts which do not formally meet the characteristics of a decision but nevertheless, in 
substance, produce binding legal effects. EC competition law constitutes one of those areas 
which falls within the broadening of the scope of the notion of “legal effects” within the 
meaning of the ERTA case-law.13 During the administrative procedure, the Commission is 
indeed required to take numerous investigative and organisational acts, which directly affect 
the legal position of the undertaking(s) concerned. The case-law provides a large number of 
examples where acts have been re-qualified so as to become decisions.14 In the Cement 
                                                 
9
 See D. Simon, Le système juridique communautaire, 3rd ed., PUF, at para. 407. 
10
 See Marie-Pierre Granger, "Towards a Liberalisation of Standing Conditions for Individuals Seeking Judicial 
Review of Community Acts: Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v. Commission and Union de Pequeños Agricultores v. 
Council", (2003) 1 Modern Law Review, 124 at p.132. 
11
 See Case C 22/70, Commission v. Council, [1971] E.C.R. I-263 at para. 42. See also Case C 294/83, Les Verts 
v. Parliament, [1986] E.C.R. 1339 at para. 24 which states that those acts “intended to have legal effects vis-à-
vis third parties” can be challenged on the basis of Article 230 EC. 
12
 In accordance with Article 249 EC: “A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is 
addressed”. 
13
 See D. Simon, supra note 9 at para. 414. 
14
 The contrary scenario by which a decision is re-interpreted so as to be qualified as a non-binding act seems 
theoretically feasible but has limited practical application. The Dalmine case, however, provides an example. 
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judgment, for instance, some of the undertakings challenged a letter through which the 
Commission withdrew the benefit of immunity from fines.15 The ECJ held that the appeal was 
admissible since the letter was “a measure which produces legal effects touching the interests 
of the undertaking concerned and which is binding on them. It thus constitute[d] not a mere 
opinion but a decision”. The CFI even recognised that in the context of the control of 
concentrations between undertakings laid down by Regulation 4064/89, a statement by the 
spokesman for the Commissioner responsible for competition matters, made on behalf of the 
Commission, announcing that a proposed concentration between two undertakings fall outside 
the ambit of the aforementioned regulation, since it did not have a Community dimension 
within the meaning of Article 1, was capable of forming the subject-matter of an action for 
annulment.16 
 
In other cases, the ECJ has not explicitly interpreted an act so as to qualify it as a decision but 
merely assessed the content and reach of a given act in order to conclude that it produced or 
aimed at producing binding legal effects.17 Therefore, the rejection of a complaint,18 a letter 
detailing the reasons for which the Commission will not follow up on a complaint,19 the grant 
or refusal to grant third-party access to the file,20 and the refusal to hear interested third 
parties,21 were considered as challengeable acts within the meaning of Article 230 EC. In 
France v. Commission, the ECJ held that even a Commission notice which aimed at formally 
interpreting a directive but which surreptitiously introduced new legal obligations could be 
the subject of an annulment action.22 
 
Third, the relevant act must be of a definitive nature. In other words, a preparatory act which 
only constitutes one of the steps towards a final decision cannot be challenged.23 This 
principle was established in the well-known judgment IBM v. Commission.24 The ECJ held:  
                                                                                                                                                        
The CFI adjudged a decision enjoining the applicant to provide the required information within 30 days, failure 
to do so resulting in periodic penalty payments as “not produc[ing] binding legal effects and does not therefore 
constitute a challengeable measure for the purposes of Article [230] of the Treaty. Nor does such a decision 
produce binding legal effects in so far as it holds the applicant jointly liable for the periodic penalty payments 
imposed on addressees of the same decision. That decision constitutes only a procedural stage during which the 
Commission adopts, where appropriate, a decision definitively fixing the total amount of the periodic penalty 
payment and thus bearing enforceable authority”. It is therefore only a preparatory act which does not raise 
objections as such. See Order of the European Court of First Instance, T-596/97, Dalmine v. Commission, [1998] 
E.C.R. II-2383. 
15
 See Joined Cases C-8-11/66, Société anonyme Cimenteries C.B.R. Cementsbedrijven N.V. and others v. 
Commission [1993] E.C.R. 75. 
16
 Case T-3/93, Air France v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. II-121. 
17
 See S. Van Raepenbusch, Droit Institutionnel de l’Union Européenne, Larcier, 4th ed., 2005, p. 616. 
18
 Case C-39/93, SFEI v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. I-2681. 
19
 Case T-64/89, Automec I, [1990] E.C.R. II-3671. 
20
 Case T-2/03, Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission, (so-called Lombard Cartel) not yet reported. 
See L. Ritter and D. Braun, European Competition Law: A Practitioner’s Guide, 3rd ed., Kluwer Law 
International, 2004, p.1155. 
21
 See C. Kerse and N. Khan, supra note 2 at para. 8.033. 
22
 Case C-325/91, France v. Commission, [1993] E.C.R. I-3283 
23
 Case C-23/63, Société anonyme Usines Emile Henricot and others v. High Authority, [1963] E.C.R. 441, 455: 
“It follows from the natural meaning of the word that a decision marks the culmination of procedure within the 
High Authority, and is thus the definitive expression of its intentions [...] that a decision must appear as a 
measure taken by the High Authority, acting as a body, intended to produce legal effects and constituting the 
culmination of procedure within the High Authority, whereby the High Authority gives its final ruling in a form 
from which its nature can be identified”. 
24
 Certain commentators have explained that this rule is necessary to avoid a situation by which the Commission 
finds itself impeded by too many intermediary appeals. See P. Duffy, supra note 2 at p. 555. See also D. Simon, 
supra note 9 at p. 520. This justification is not, however, convincing. An annulment action does not produce 
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“[...] it is clear from the case-law that in principle an act is open to review only if it is a 
measure definitively laying down the position of the Commission or the Council on the 
conclusion of that procedure, and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for the 
final decision”.25 
 
Relying on this principle, the ECJ held that a statement of objections or a letter initiating a 
procedure were not open to challenge.26 In Guérin, the letters through which the Commission 
responded to complaints and invited the plaintiffs to make comments were adjudged 
preparatory and as such deemed to fall outside the scope of an Article 230 EC annulment 
action.27 The same response was also given in cases involving a refusal to give access to the 
file to those involved in the procedure or a refusal to hear them.28 
 
The ECJ did, however, recognize in its IBM judgment that there was one exception to the 
principle establishing that the act must be of a definitive nature: 
 
“[...] if acts or decisions adopted in the course of the preparatory proceedings not only bore all 
the legal characteristics referred to above [that is to say producing legal obligations affecting 
the interests of the appellant] but in addition were themselves the culmination of a special 
procedure distinct from that intended to permit the Commission or the Council to take a 
decision on the substance of the case”.29 
 
This exception is directed at those situations in which the acts fall within a phase which can 
be separated from the course of proceedings leading to the definitive act.30 EC competition 
law provides numerous illustrations of this exception insofar as the implementation of 
Articles 81, 82 and the merger regulation is organized in several successive and distinct 
phases (such as, for example, the preliminary investigation, the investigation, the hearing, 
etc.). The case-law has therefore accepted that requests for information or on-the-spot 
investigations are acts challengeable within the meaning of Article 230 EC.31 
 
2. Acts open to challenge within the field of competition law post modernisation 
 
The recent spate of reforms in the field of competition law was accompanied by the removal, 
within the Community legal order, of a series of acts whose contentious status was the object 
                                                                                                                                                        
suspensive effects. It is therefore difficult to see how the lodging of an annulment action could hinder 
institutional action. See Article 242 of the EC Treaty. It would seem more correct to state that the ECJ does not 
regard preparatory acts as producing legal effects insofar as they can later be cancelled out by a subsequent 
measure. 
25
 Case C-60/81, IBM v. Commission, [1981] E.C.R. 2639. 
26
 In any case, the legal defects affecting preparatory acts can always be challenged incidentally on the back of 
an appeal against the final act. See IBM v. Commission, id. at para. 12: “whilst measures of a purely preparatory 
character may not themselves be the subject of an application for a declaration that they are void, any legal 
defects therein may be relied upon in an action directed against the definitive act for which they represent a 
preparatory step”. 
27
 Case C-282/95, Guérin automobiles v. Commission, [1997] E.C.R. I-1503. 
28
 Case T-10/92, Cimenteries CBR SA v. Commission, [1992] E.C.R. II-2667 at para. 42. See also Case T-61/02, 
Commerzbank v. Commission, not yet reported. See also C. Kerse and N. Khan supra note 2 at para. 8.033, p. 
473. 
29
 IBM v. Commission, supra note 25 at para 11. 
30
 See S. Van Raepenbusch, supra note 17 at p. 617. 
31
 See respectively Case C-374/87, Orkem v. Commission, [1989] E.C.R. 3283 and Case C-46/87 and 227/88, 
Hoechst v. Commission, [1987] E.C.R. 2859. 
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of strained debate.32 The reforms have, however, maintained a series of acts whose 
contentious status deserves mention (2.1). In addition, they have introduced new types of acts, 
whose challengeable status, from the point of view of Article 230 EC is to say the least 
obscure (2.2).33 
 
2.1. Acts maintained under Regulation 1/2003 
 
Regulation 1/2003 maintains a large amount of acts that were found in Regulation 17/62. The 
challengeable status of these acts within the meaning of Article 230 EC therefore remains 
similar and the solutions found in the case-law can be transposed. These acts include 
decisions finding and terminating an infringement,34 the ordering of interim measures by 
decision,35 binding commitment decisions,36 exemption decisions and the withdrawal of the 
benefit of exemption regulations.37 In the same way, Commission decisions involving a 
rejection of a complaint foreseen in Article 7 of Regulation 773/2004 with regards to the 
implementation of Articles 81 and 82 must be considered challengeable, as is foreseen by a 
steady stream of case-law.38 Finally, all those decisions for which the right to appeal to the 
Community Courts is expressly envisaged by Regulation 1/2003 can be the subject of an 
annulment action, e.g. requests for information by decision,39 inspections ordered by 
decision,40 or decisions imposing a fine or periodic penalty payments.41  
                                                 
32
  For instance, “comfort letters” through which the Commission terminated a procedure without taking a 
negative clearance decision or granting an exemption. See C. Kerse and N. Khan, supra note 2 at p. 475. In 
accordance with the Perfume cases, the Commission was of the opinion that these letters were devoid of any 
binding legal effect and that they therefore escaped judicial review as envisaged by Article 230 EC, while the 
ECJ and CFI have both acknowledged, with great caution, the admissibility of an appeal against these decisions. 
See M. Waelbroeck and A. Frignani, Commentaire Mégret – Concurrence, 2nd ed., 1997, at paras. 433 and 485. 
33
 These observations are particularly relevant in relation to Regulation 1/2003. Regulation 139/2004, on the 
other hand, does not bring about any real changes with regards to acts open to challenge in an annulment action. 
The applicants can request the annulment of various formal decisions envisaged in Articles 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, and 
14, (See Case T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics BV v. Commission, [2003] E.C.R. II-1433) or of those 
decisions by which the Commission dismisses a potential acquirer of a divested entity following the imposition 
of a structural remedy (See Case T-342/00, Petrolessence et SG2R v. Commission, [2003] E.C.R. II-1161). 
34
 Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3. 
35
 Article 8 of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3 codifying the Camera Care case-law, Order of the European 
Court of Justice, C-792/79, Camera Care v. Commission, [1980] E.C.R. 119. 
36
 Regulation 17/62 did not include a specific provision entrusting the Commission to adopt binding commitment 
decisions. However, the case-law recognised this power to the Commission which it used in a substantial number 
of cases. An explicit legal basis is now provided for by Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3. See J. 
Temple Lang, “Commitment Decisions under Regulation 1/2003”, (2003) 8 E.C.L.R. 350; E. Paulis and C. 
Gauer, “La réforme des règles d’application des articles 81 et 82 du Traité”, (2003) 97 JTDroit Européen 63. 
37
 The adoption of exemption decisions following Regulation 1/2003 cannot be excluded, even if such decisions 
are likely to be rare in practice. See contra, S. Blake, C. Gauer, L. Kjolbye, D. Dalheimer, E. De Smijter, D. 
Schnichels and M. Laurila, “Regulation 1/2003 and the Modernisation Package fully applicable since 1 May 
2004”, (2004) 2 Competition Policy Newsletter 5-6. The power to withdraw an exemption is provided for by 
Article 29 (1) of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3. 
38
 See Article 7 (2) of Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings 
by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (2004) L 123/18. See SFEI v. Commission, 
supra note 14 and C. Kerse and N. Khan, supra note 2 at p. 473. 
39
 See Article 18 (1) of Regulation 1/2003, the right to appeal being expressly envisaged in Article 18 (3). 
40
 See Article 20 (1) of Regulation 1/2003, the right to appeal being expressly envisaged in Article 20 (4). See 
also Articles 21 (1) and (3) which foresee the same right in relation to inspections of non business premises. 
41
 See respectively Articles 23 and 24 of Regulation 1/2003 which endow the Commission with the power to 
impose fines and periodic penalty payments. Article 31 of the Regulation explicitly envisages that decisions 
through which it imposes a fine or a periodic penalty payment can be the subject to appeal before the Court 
which has unlimited jurisdiction. Certain commentators do, however, consider that periodic penalty payments 
are not acts open to challenge. See C. Kerse and N. Khan, supra note 2 at p. 476.  
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2.2.  New acts foreseen by Regulation 1/2003 
 
It is on the other hand with regards to certain “new acts” envisaged by Regulation 1/2003 that 
the situation is slightly delicate. Admittedly, some of these measures are mentioned in 
Chapter III of the Regulation which deals with “Commission decisions”. But that does not 
rule out in any way the possibility that the Community Courts may declare an annulment 
action in relation to one or several of these acts inadmissible under Article 230 EC.42 
 
a) Commission decisions to remove cases – Article 11(6) of Regulation 1/2003 
 
Under the former system of Regulation 17/62, the Commission enjoyed an overarching 
supremacy over the implementation of EC competition rules. The advantage of this system 
was the uniform application of EC competition law. The reforms brought in by Regulation 
1/2003 entailed a shift of the centre of gravity in the implementation of Articles 81 and 82 EC 
towards the national level. In order to prevent the risk of the non-uniform application of EC 
competition law, the legislator bestowed upon the Commission the power to relieve national 
competition authorities of their competence to apply the EC competition rules.43 In 
accordance with Article 11 (6) of Regulation 1/2003: 
 
“The initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision [...] shall 
relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to apply Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty”. 
 
Questions concerning whether Commission decisions relieving national competition 
authorities of their competence are challengeable could be summarily treated on the basis of 
the principles found in the case-law. The IBM case-law, which excludes decisions to initiate a 
procedure from the scope of challengeable acts on the grounds that these acts are a 
preparatory step towards a final decision, could potentially be transposed to this type of act. 
Several reasons, however, could allow us to hold that Commission decisions recalling cases 
from the national level deserve special treatment and be considered as “challengeable” within 
the meaning of Article 230 EC.44 First, the decision to open a procedure on the basis of 
Article 11 (6) is admittedly a preparatory decision, but it is above all a final decision to close 
the phase of examination in progress before the national authority. The decision could, 
therefore, as such benefit from the exception laid down in the IBM judgment on the ground 
that it constitutes the end of a special procedure. 
 
Second, the implementation of the power to recall a case undeniably produces legally binding 
effects. First and foremost, Member States are legally affected when the Commission 
                                                 
42
 See our comments above. See contra, E. Paulis and C. Gauer, supra note 36 at para. 38, who consider that all 
decisions adopted by the Commission are acts within the meaning of Article 249 EC and thus seem to infer that 
they are challengeable on the basis of Article 230 EC. 
43
 Various reasons give rise to the fear that the different national competition authorities may not apply EC 
competition law uniformly. First, there are considerable differences in material and human resources within the 
various national competition authorities. Further, the national competition authorities could potentially 
discriminate between domestic and foreign undertakings when applying the competition rules in order to achieve 
protectionist objectives. Finally, the legal and political traditions of the Member States are so different, that the 
risk of divergent interpretations of identical concepts has been judged as high. See D. Geradin, “Competition 
between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Proposed Modernization of the 
Enforcement of EC Competition Law”, (2002) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 1. 
44
 This question has been evoked but left unanswered by C. Kerse and N. Khan, supra note 2 at p. 476. 
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neutralizes the competence of the national competition authority.45 Further, by being 
subjected to a new procedure governed by different rules the undertakings concerned are 
legally affected. The effect on the undertakings is all the stronger if the procedure before the 
relevant national authority has reached an advanced stage. Indeed, in this hypothetical 
scenario, apart from the extra costs for the undertaking concerned, the Commission’s decision 
wipes out a quasi-definitive conclusion of the national authority which has legal effects for 
the undertakings concerned (for example, if they have negotiated commitments, etc). 
 
Finally, the coherence of the system of EC competition law militates in favour of recognizing 
the possibility to initiate annulment actions against Article 11 (6) decisions. Indeed, within the 
framework of merger control, Article 9 of Regulation 139/2004 on the control of 
concentrations allows the Commission to refer in part or in whole merger operations to a 
national authority.46 This mechanism, which brushes aside the competence of one authority in 
favour of another one at a different level is not so different from the Article 11 (6) 
mechanism. In addition, within the framework of the control of concentrations, the CFI has 
held that the decision to refer a case affected the legal situation of the parties to the 
concentration and could therefore be the subject of an action for annulment.47 
 
b) Guidance Letters - Paragraph 38 of the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 
 
The abolition of the requirement to notify agreements has meant that undertakings are no 
longer able to clarify their legal position by subjecting a given agreement to Commission 
examination. In order to temper the legal uncertainty resulting from this development, 
paragraph 38 of the preamble to Regulation 1/2003 allows undertakings to seek the informal 
view of the Commission on a practice (the mechanism does not limit itself to agreements) 
which would create uncertainty in the application of the competition rules because of the 
novel problems it raises and the absence of clarity in the law.48 The Commission has specified 
in its “Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions” the circumstances in which it 
would reply to such requests.49 It would seem, on this occasion, that the Commision has 
                                                 
45
 See D. Schnichels, “The Network of Competition Authorities : How Will it work in Practice”, in D. Geradin, 
ed., supra note 3 at p. 119; A. Weitbrecht, “The Network of Competition Authorities: How will it work in 
Practice – Remarks from a practitioner” in D. Geradin, ed., supra note 3 at p. 127. A similar point had been made 
in the context of Regulation 17/1962 by M. Waelbroeck and A. Frignani, supra note 32 at para. 493. 
46
 See Article 9 of Regulation 139/2004, supra note 3. 
47
 See Case T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics BV v. Commission, supra note 33 at para. 281. The analogy is 
not complete, however. As the CFI recalls, the decision to refer excludes on the one hand the application of the 
EC competition rules to an operation and submits it on the other hand to the exclusive control of the national 
competition authority. Unlike Article 11 (6) whose employment does not modify the applicable rules (Articles 
81 and 82), Article 9 of the merger regulation leads to a change in the substantive rules applicable to the parties 
as the national competition authorities apply national laws that differ from Community law. The modification of 
the applicable rules ensuing from a reference under Article 9 thus unquestionably affects the legal situation of 
the parties. However, one can observe, on the one hand, that the referral mechanism was instituted on the 
premise that the national merger control laws ensure an effective regime comparable to that found at Community 
level and, on the other hand, that an Article 11(6) referral affects the legal situation of the parties concerned as 
there is a change in the procedural rules. These two factors suggest that although not complete, an analogy 
between the two referral procedures can be envisaged. 
48
 See para. 38 of the preamble to Regulation 1/2003: “Legal certainty for undertakings operating under the 
Community competition rules contributes to the promotion of innovation and investment. Where cases give rise 
to genuine uncertainty because they present novel or unresolved questions for the application of these rules, 
individual undertakings may wish to seek informal guidance from the Commission. This Regulation is without 
prejudice to the ability of the Commission to issue such informal guidance”. 
49
 See Commission Notice on informal guidance relating to novel questions concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty that arise in individual cases (guidance letters), (2004) O.J. C 101/78. Three cumulative conditions 
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chosen to exclude the possibility of introducing an annulment action against these guidance 
letters by making it clear that these letters are not Commission decisions and that they bind 
neither the national competition authorities nor the national courts.50 
 
This solution is justified as long as these guidance letters do not disguise texts which in reality 
are prescriptive in nature imposing detailed legal obligations on the undertaking concerned 
much as decisions do. If need be, these letters should be challengeable on the basis of Article 
230 EC on the ground that they produce legal effects. 
 
c) The reallocation of cases mechanism - Article 13 of Regulation 1/2003 
 
In declaring that all members of the network of competition authorities are competent to apply 
Articles 81 and 82 EC in all cases where trade between Member States is affected, Regulation 
1/2003 poses the risk (i) that one authority that takes up a case considers at a later stage that it 
is not well placed to act because other national competition authorites (already seized or to be 
seized at a later date) are better placed or (ii) other authorities consider themselves better 
placed to act. In order to avoid the multiplication of parallel procedures stemming from one 
and the same case, the Commission has outlined in a Notice the principles concerning the 
reallocation of cases amongst authorities.51 The reallocation of a case has to be undertaken at 
the beginning of a procedure.52 Insofar as Regulation 1/2003 grants no powers to the 
Commission to take a decision on the reallocation of a case, the mechanism is implemented 
by decisions of the national competition authorities. In accordance with Article 13 of 
Regulation 1/2003, the national competition authority wishing to transfer the case must take a 
decision to suspend or close the procedure. Numerous commentators have suggested that 
these “decisions” to reallocate could be the subject of an annulment action.53 
 
In legal terms, Article 230 EC does not allow decisions by national competition authorities to 
reallocate a case to be challenged, as only decisions taken by a Community institution fall 
within this Article. An action for annulment should, however, be available in the particular 
scenario where the Commission uses the Article 11 (6) procedure to recall cases from national 
competition authorities to itself.54 The Commission has, however, sought to remove this 
possibility by stating in paragraph 31 of its Notice that “[…] the allocation of cases therefore 
does not create individual rights for the companies involved in or affected by an infringement 
                                                                                                                                                        
must be fulfilled: (i) the substantive assessment of an agreement or practice with regard to Articles 81 and 82 EC 
must raise a question of application of the law for which there is no clear answer in the existing EC legal 
framework; (ii) the clarification of the novel question through a guidance letter must be useful, especially in 
relation to its economic consequences; (iii) it must be possible to issue a guidance letter on the basis of the 
information provided, i.e. no further fact-finding is required. 
50
 See id. at para. 25.  
51
 See Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, (2004) O.J. C 101/43. 
The concept of “well placed” prevents multiple procedures before several national competition authorities. 
According to the Commission, a national competition authority is well placed to deal with a restrictive practice 
when three conditions are met. See paras. 8-9. 
52
 Id. at para. 18. In any case, the re-allocation must take place within a period of two months, starting from the 
date of the first information sent to the network pursuant to Article 11 of the Regulation: “Where case re-
allocation issues arise, they should be resolved swiftly, normally within a period of two months starting from the 
date of the first information sent to the network pursuant to Article 11 of the Council Regulation. During this 
period, competition authorities will endeavour to reach an agreement on a possible re-allocation and, where 
relevant, on the modalities for parallel action”. 
53
 See E. Paulis and C. Gauer, supra note 36 at para. 74, as well as L. Idot “Le nouveau système communautaire 
de mise en oeuvre des articles 81 et 82 CE”, (2003) Cahiers de Droit Européen 283 at para. 82. 
54
 In its Notice (see above), the Commission seems to interpret Article 11 (6) as an instrument to re-allocate 
cases. 
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to have the case dealt with by a particular authority”.55 One can only guess that the 
Commission considers that a decision to reallocate a case, should it take the form of a 
decision to recall a case within the meaning of Article 11 (6), does not affect the legal 
situation of natural and legal persons. This opinion is open to criticism for the reasons 
outlined above, however.56 
 
d)  Findings of inapplicability 
 
The abolition of the system of notification/exemption with the introduction of Regulation 
1/2003 could have had the effect of depriving the Commission of a useful instrument to 
develop its general policy. Published individual exemption decisions allowed the Commission 
to lay down, in a given sector, the general principles applicable to agreements between 
undertakings.57 Article 10 of Regulation 1/2003 therefore aims to allow for this possibility by 
permitting the Commission to adopt ex officio decisions finding that Articles 81 and 82 are 
not applicable to certain practices.58 Despite them being formally regarded as decisions, 
doubts could be voiced as to the legal status of decisions finding Articles 81 and 82 
inapplicable. First and foremost, these decisions do not put an end to a procedure, since the 
Commission acts on its own initiative and does not address specific undertakings.59 Moreover, 
Regulation 1/2003 states that these decisions are “declaratory” in nature and therefore, a 
contrario, not constitutive of rights.60 Finally, they produce adverse legal effects against the 
undertakings which could benefit from such decisions in so far as they hold that there is no 
violation.61 
 
                                                 
55
 See L. Idot, supra note 53 at para. 82. 
56
 E. Paulis and C. Gauer consider that “the only decision taken by other authorities is to refrain from acting and 
thus to exclude [...] another procedure. This does not raise objections against an undertaking and therefore does 
not constitute a challengeable act”. See E. Paulis and C. Gauer, supra note 36 at para. 74. It seems, however, 
difficult to subscribe to this opinion. Several parties consulted by the Commission before the adoption of the 
notice have, for instance, mentioned that a re-allocation decision leads to considerable costs for the undertakings 
concerned, for example, translation fees, delays, etc. See the observations submitted by Clifford Chance at p. 11. 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, p. 6, Gide Loyrette Nouel, p. 2; Latham & Watkins, p. 10 available at:  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/procedural_rules/comments/ 
Decisions of reallocation thus affect the legal position of the parties insofar as the procedural rules applicable 
before the various national competition authorities diverge considerably in relation to procedure or sanctions. 
Certain commentators have proposed that the question of resolving case allocation issues should be the object of 
a mechanism within the framework of the consultative committee on agreements and dominant positions. See 
comments made by Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and Hamilton at p. 5. The final Notice envisages that the consultative 
committee could be the forum for examining and allocating cases, in the situation where the Commission decides 
to make use of its power to remove cases after the initial time-limit for reallocation foreseen in the Notice, i.e. 
two months. It makes it clear, however, that the opinion of the Committee is unofficial. See para. 62 of the 
Notice, supra note 51. 
57
 Certain commentators have reported that, under the former system of Regulation 17/62, the Commission had, 
after having adopted individual exemption decisions, conferred an educational value to these decisions by 
indicating that it would no longer grant individual exemptions to analogous practices. See L. Idot, supra note 53 
at para. 210. 
58
 Unlike guidance letters which are requested by the undertakings. 
59
 They cannot therefore be challenged on the basis of the SFEI case-law, supra note 18. 
60
 An act is regarded as “constitutive” when it gives rise to a novel state of the law. See G. Cornu, Vocabulaire 
Juridique, PUF, 3rd ed., 2000. An act is considered as “declaratory” when it simply acknowledges a legal or 
factual situation. 
61
 Within the framework of Article 81, where the conditions of para. 1 are not satisfied, or whether the conditions 
of para. 3 are satisfied. Within the framework of Article 82, the conditions for its application are not satisfied. 
See L. Idot, supra note 53 at para. 212. 
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Despite these reservations, it would seem that these decisions do nevertheless show 
characteristics of challengeable acts. First and foremost, in the same way as an exemption 
decision taken on the basis of Article 81 (3) EC, a finding of inapplicability of provisions of 
the Treaty produces legal effects potentially affecting the interests of third parties to the 
practice which is the subject of the particular decision.62 Moreover, findings of inapplicability 
are binding on national competition authorities and the national courts of the Member States 
in as far as Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003, which prohibits these bodies from taking a 
decision contrasting with that of the Commission, does not draw any distinction between the 
different types of decisions.63 The possibility to appeal against findings of inapplicability must 
therefore be retained. 
 
e) Decisions refusing to grant interim relief 
 
Regulation 17/62 did not explicitly envisage the possibility for the Commission to order 
interim acts. After an extensive interpretation of Article 3 in its Camera Care order, the ECJ 
did however bestow upon the Commission the power to order this type of act.64 In practice, 
however, most interim measures were ordered upon the request of undertakings rather than by 
the Commission acting on its own initiative.65 The ECJ subsequently accepted that the order 
or refusal to grant interim measures by the Commission could be the subject of an annulment 
action.66 
 
This power granted by the ECJ to the Commission has been codified in Article 8 of 
Regulation 1/2003. The formulation of this provision strays, however, from the solutions 
found in practice. In the words of the Regulation, “the Commission, acting on its own 
initiative may by decision [...] order interim measures”. By laying down that ex officio action 
by the Commission is the only circumstance under which interim measures can be ordered, 
Article 8 would seem to mean that complainants do not have a corresponding right to seek 
interim relief.67 As Kerse and Khan observe, the formulation of Article 8 aims principally at 
shielding the Commission from annulment actions when it refuses to provide interim relief.68 
                                                 
62
 The case-law has recognised that exemption decisions could be challenged on the basis of Article 230 EC by 
competitors to the agreement in question. See E. Paulis and C. Gauer, supra note 36 at para. 35; L. Idot, supra 
note 53 at para. 212; See also article 10 of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3. 
63
 Id. at para. 213. 
64
 See Order of the European Court of Justice, Case C-792/79, Camera Care v. Commission, [1980] E.C.R. 119 
at para. 18: “from this point of view the commission must also be able, within the bounds of its supervisory task 
conferred upon it in competition matters by the treaty and regulation no 17, to take protective measures to the 
extent to which they might appear indispensable in order to avoid the exercise of the power to make decisions 
given by article 3 from becoming ineffectual or even illusory because of the action of certain undertakings the 
powers which the commission holds under article 3 (1) of regulation no 17 therefore include the power to take 
interim measures which are indispensable for the effective exercise of its functions and, in particular, for 
ensuring the effectiveness of any decisions requiring undertakings to bring to an end infringements which it has 
found to exist”. 
65
 See, for a well-known example, Commission decision of 3 July 2001, NDC Health/IMS Health, (2003) O.J. L 
268/69. 
66
 For an example where interim measures were granted, see Order of the President of the CFI, Case T-184/01, 
IMS Health Inc. v. Commission, [2001] E.C.R. II-3193. For an example where interim measures were refused, 
Case T-44/90, La Cinq v. Commission, [1992] E.C.R. II-1. 
67
 In practice, however, it is very likely that complainants will continue to request that the Commission orders 
interim measures.  
68
 See C. Kerse and N. Khan, supra note 2 at para. 6.032. 
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Indeed, this refusal cannot affect the legal situation of undertakings requesting them insofar as 
these undertakings are in no position to avail themselves of such a right.69 
 
The formulation of Article 8 is open to criticism. The ECJ has always considered that the 
adoption of interim measures is essential in the scenario where there is a “risk of serious and 
irreparable damage to competition”.70 A steady and constant line of case-law demonstrates 
that this condition covers harm caused to certain economic operators as a result of an anti-
competitive practice.71 The Community Courts thus acknowledge that interim measures are 
primarily directed at economic operators that have suffered at the hands of such a practice. A 
real right to interim relief is consequently acknowledged on the part of economic operators as 
long as the conditions laid down by the Community Courts are fulfilled. The refusal to give 
access to this right directly affects their legal situation and therefore raises objections within 
the meaning of Article 230 EC.72 
 
f)  Final observations on challengeable acts 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the challengeable status of certain acts remains 
unclear.73 This situation is unsatisfactory. The lack of clarity harms potential plaintiffs who, 
believing that they have been the victim of illegal behaviour, envisage the introduction of an 
annulment action but are, however, put off because of the risk that their claim will not be 
examined and declared inadmissible from the beginning. On the other hand, this obfuscation 
may benefit the Commission, which takes a back-seat role when its decisions are the subject 
of an annulment action. In this context, the need for adequate legal protection calls for a 
clarification of the legal nature of a series of new acts which can be adopted by the 
Commission in its implementation of EC competition law. 
 
The question as to how this subject should be clarified, or in other words whether there should 
be an extension of the range of challengeable acts, remains open. The Commission is 
generally in favour of a restrictive interpretation of the notion of challengeable act while 
practitioners prefer a more flexible approach. In support of a restrictive approach one could 
cite the necessity to avoid a paralysis of the enforcement effects of the Commission actions.74 
One could also argue that generalist judges are not capable to effect satisfactory judicial 
control of competition law decisions involving complex economic analysis. 
                                                 
69
 A principle to which the Commission entirely subscribes in its Notice on the handling of complaints by the 
Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, (2004) O.J. C-101/65 at para. 80: “Article 8 of 
Regulation 1/2003 makes it clear that interim measures cannot be applied for by complainants under Article 7 (2) 
of Regulation 1/2003”. This codification was immediately interpreted by legal scholars as aiming to “reserve the 
weapon in the form of interim measures” to the Commission exclusively, complainants being able to address 
themselves to the national courts to obtain interim measures. See L. Idot, supra note 53 at para. 204. Van Bael & 
Bellis, supra note 8 at para. 10.17, p. 1100. 
70
 In addition to proof of fumus boni juris, i.e. a finding of a prima facie violation. See Article 8 of Regulation 
1/2003 supra note 3. 
71
 See Order of the President of the Court of 29 September 1982, Ford v. Commission, 228/82 R and 229/82 
[1982] E.C.R. 3091. 
72
 See L. Ritter and D. Braun who reach the same conclusion, without giving reasons why however. The question 
as to whether we are dealing with preparatory and non definitive acts could be raised. The case-law seems to see 
them as final acts, supra note 20 at p. 1154. 
73
  Outside the cases examined above, other acts adopted by the Commission do not seem to be challengeable as 
(i) they do produce legal effects affecting adversely a legal or natural person or (ii) are simply preparatory acts. 
Such is the case, for example, with measures by which the Commission transmits documents to national 
competition authorities in accordance of Article 11 (2) of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3. 
74
 See by analogy, D. Simon, supra note 9 at para. 415. 
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The above justifications are not convincing, however, and it would seem on the other hand 
that if the legal nature of some new acts under Regulation 1/2003 is crying out for 
clarification, it is perhaps an opportune moment for the Community courts to insist upon a 
broad interpretation. First, there is a real risk of arbitrariness if the European Commission, 
within the framework of the powers given to it by Regulation 1/2003, is not subject to wide-
ranging judicial review. The risk of such arbitrariness, which has often been criticized given 
the Commission’s functions of both investigation and decision-taking, could be accentuated 
by the application of a restrictive interpretation of the notion of challengeable act to new acts 
under Regulation 1/2003. Second, the justifications forwarded in support of a restrictive 
approach fail to convince. First and foremost, the risk that the Commission will be hindered in 
its action is nonsense since the bringing of an annulment action does not, as is foreseen by 
Article 242 EC, have a suspensive effect. Further, the Community Courts (especially the CFI) 
have already shown that they are capable of dealing with complex economic questions, such 
as in the Gencor, Airtours and Tetra Leval judgments. 
 
 
III.  Those having the “quality to act” in annulment 
 
The definition of those entitled to bring an annulment action is found in Article 230 EC. The 
Treaty distinguishes between two types of potential applicant. First, there are the “privileged” 
applicants, which encompass the institutions of the Union and its Member States. This type of 
applicant can initiate annulment proceedings against any act (both normative and individual) 
without having to furnish proof of a “specific quality to act”.75 Second, there are the 
“individual” applicants which encompass both legal and natural persons. An individual 
applicant is presumed to be able to bring an annulment action if he is the addressee.76 On the 
other hand, an individual applicant may not bring an action for annulment against an act if he 
is not the addressee (a decision addressed to a third party or an act of a general nature unless 
he proves that he is “directly and individually concerned” by the act in question).77 
 
The latter condition has been restrictively interpreted by the judiciary, the result being that the 
ECJ has generally refused access to the court to individual applicants wishing to challenge 
decisions that are not addressed to them or acts of a general nature. Competition litigation is, 
however, frequently cited as an example of a field where the rigour of the legal test has been 
relaxed.78 Individual applicants are therefore often able to act against decisions to which they 
are not the addressee (1). On the other hand, the case-law remains excessively strict in relation 
to acts of a general nature (2).  
 
1. Decisions where the applicant is not the addressee 
 
An individual applicant wishing to bring an annulment action against a decision that is not 
addressed to him must prove that he is both directly and individually concerned by it. The first 
of these conditions (directly concerned) requires proof that the act produces immediate effects 
                                                 
75
 See D. Simon, supra note 9 at paras. 416 and 419. The European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the 
ECB must, however, prove the existence of an institutional interest to act, i.e. aiming at safeguarding their 
prerogatives. 
76
 With the exception, however, of proceedings against positive decisions (e.g., exemption decisions). See D. 
Simon, supra note 9 at para. 422. 
77
 See Article 230 EC. 
78
 See D. Simon, supra note 9 at para. 428. 
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on the legal situation of the individual without the need for later intervention of national or 
Community authorities.79 As the competition rules are implemented via the adoption of 
decisions addressed directly to undertakings, it is often acknowledged that third parties are 
directly concerned. 
 
The second condition (individually concerned) requires applicants to prove that the decision 
affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or “by reason of 
circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons, and by virtue of these 
factors distinguishes them individually just as in the case of the person addressed”.80 Within 
the sphere of competition law, this requirement is assessed with flexibility. The active 
participation of third parties within the administrative procedure generally allows for a 
presumption that these parties are directly and individually concerned by the adopted 
decision. However, in certain cases, the ECJ did not require that the applicant should have 
effectively participated in the procedure.81 It has considered that in order to be regarded as 
individually concerned, it suffices that the texts governing the administrative procedure 
foresee the possibility for the applicant to intervene as a complainant,82 or to be simply heard 
in order to make comments.83 
 
In so far as the texts governing the enforcement procedure in relation to agreements and abuse 
of a dominant position,84 or in relation to merger control,85 extensively open up the ability to 
                                                 
79
 See Case C-386/96, Société Louis Dreyfus & Cie v. Commission, [1998] E.C.R. I-2309 at para 43. 
80
 Case C-25/62, Plauman, [1962] E.C.R. 305. This condition has been harshly criticized by legal commentators. 
81
 See Joined Cases T-528/93, T542/93, T543/93 and T-546/93, Métropole télévision SA, Reti Televisive Italiane 
SpA, Gestevision Telecinco SA et Antena 3 de Television v. Commission, [1996] E.C.R. 649 at para. 62. Case T-
96/92, CE de la Société des grandes sources and others v. Commission, [1992] E.C.R. II-1213, paras. 35 and 36. 
82
 See the principle laid down in Metro, Case C-26/76, Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH &Co KG v. Commission, 
[1977] E.C.R. 1875 at para. 13: “it is in the interests of a satisfactory administration of justice and of the proper 
application of Articles 85 and 86 that natural or legal persons who are entitled, pursuant to Article 3 (2) (b) of 
Regulation No 17, to request the Commission to find an infringement of Articles 85 and 86 should be able, if 
their request is not complied with either wholly or in part, to institute proceedings in order to protect their 
legitimate interests”. 
83
 See, for example, the possibility to hear representatives of workers’ organisations envisaged in Article 18 (4) 
of the Regulation 4064/89; Case T-96/92, CE de la Société des grandes sources and others v. Commission, 
[1992] E.C.R. II-1213, paras. 35 and 36. But effective participation leads to the bestowal of having a “quality to 
act”, see Case 75/84, Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co KG v. Commission, [1986] E.C.R. 3021 at paras. 222-
223. 
84
 See, for example, Articles 27 (3) and (4) of Regulation 1/2003, supra note 3 which envisage: If the 
Commission considers it necessary, it may also hear other natural or legal persons. Applications to be heard on 
the part of such persons shall, where they show a sufficient interest, be granted. The competition authorities of 
the Member States may also ask the Commission to hear other natural or legal persons. Where the Commission 
intends to adopt a decision pursuant to Article 9 or Article 10, it shall publish a concise summary of the case and 
the main content of the commitments or of the proposed course of action. Interested third parties may submit 
their observations within a time limit which is fixed by the Commission in its publication and which may not be 
less than one month. Publication shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of 
their business secrets”. See Article 13 (1) of Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the 
conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty; (2004) O.J. L 
123/18: “natural or legal persons other than those referred to in Articles 5 and 11 apply to be heard and show a 
sufficient interest, the Commission shall inform them in writing of the nature and subject matter of the procedure 
and shall set a time-limit within which they may make known their views in writing”. 
85
 See Article 18 of Regulation 139/2004, supra note 3 and Article 11 of Commission Regulation 802/2004 of 7 
April 2004 implementing Council Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
(2004) L 133. For the purposes of the rights to be heard pursuant to Article 18 of Regulation 139/2004, the 
following parties are distinguished: (a) notifying parties, that is, persons or undertakings submitting a 
notification pursuant to Article 4(2) of Regulation 139/2004; (b) other involved parties, that is, parties to the 
proposed concentration other than the notifying parties, such as the seller and the undertaking which is the target 
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intervene in a procedure by making indefinite reference to the “interest” of persons in 
question, the number of potential applicants is extremely high.86 The case-law provides many 
illustrations such as the admission of annulment actions by suppliers, consumer associations,87 
actual or potential competitors,88 and even non-competitors operating on neighbouring 
markets.89 
 
The broadening, in the case-law, of the scope of the “quality to act” in competition law 
litigation is to be welcomed as it guarantees effective legal protection to natural and legal 
persons.90 Nevertheless, this approach could equally lead to access to the court being given on 
a too broad a basis and allowing annulment actions to be admitted by applicants whose 
“interest to act” is diametrically opposed to the objective of protecting competition. The 
condition of having an “interest to act” (“intérêt à agir”), which exists in numerous national 
legal systems, is not in fact a necessary requirement under Article 230 EC.91 This gap has 
never been filled by the ECJ. The latter only examines sporadically whether the applicant well 
and truly has an interest to act. It often assumes that this interest exists once direct and 
individual concern has been proved.92 This confusion of concepts has led to legal solutions 
which are open to criticism in two types of case. 
 
First, trade unions often oppose mergers involving undertakings to which they are affiliated as 
these operations can have a detrimental impact on the employees they represent. Trade unions 
have therefore attempted to use annulment actions envisaged by Article 230 EC to challenge 
Commission decisions clearing a merger. Insofar as the interest of these applicants is foreign 
to the objectives pursued by competition rules (and being rather a matter concerning 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the concentration; (c) third persons, that is natural or legal persons, including customers, suppliers and 
competitors, provided they demonstrate a sufficient interest within the meaning of Article 18(4), second 
sentence, of Regulation 139/2004, which is the case in particular - for members of the administrative or 
management bodies of the undertakings concerned or the recognised representatives of their employees; - for 
consumer associations, where the proposed concentration concerns products or services used by final consumers; 
(d) parties regarding whom the Commission intends to take a decision pursuant to Article 14 or Article 15 of 
Regulation 139/2004. 
86
 C. Kerse and N. Khan define a person as having an interest to act as every person suffering or having suffered 
direct loss or harm as a result of the practice in question. See supra note 2 at para. 2.016 and para. 8.030. 
87
 Case T-37/92, Bureau européen des unions des consommateurs et National Consumer Council v. Commission, 
[1994] E.C.R. II-285. See, on the other hand, the more restrictive conditions applicable to associations of 
undertakings, which must prove (i) that they are invested with the mandate to represent their members and (ii) 
that the practice in question causes serious harm to the interests of their members. See Case T-114/92, BEMIM 
vs. Commission, [1995] E.C.R. II-147. See also Case T-87/92, BVBA Kruidvat v. Commission, [1996] E.C.R. II-
1913. 
88
 Case T-3/93, société anonyme à participation ouvrière Compagnie nationale Air France v. Commission, 
[1994] E.C.R. II-121at para. 82 
89
 Case T-158/2000, ARD v. Commission, not yet reported. 
90
 See K. Lenaerts and J. Vanhamme, “Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative 
Process”, (1997) 34 C.M.L.R. 557 and L. Ortiz Blanco, supra note 2 at p. 325 who consider that the case-law is 
quite flexible. This observation is limited to competition law litigation (or to anti-dumping litigation), as the 
case-law in other fields is much more restrictive. 
91
 See M. Canedo, supra note 2 at p. 454. 
92
 The ECJ may examine the question of interest to act in order to determine if, because of the development of 
legal and factual circumstances, there is still an interest in bringing an annulment action against the challenged 
act. Thus, in the recent MCI Inc. vs Commission where the parties (WorldCom – later MCI and Sprint) had 
abandoned the merger before the Commission had adopted a decision, it still continued with the procedure and 
adopted a prohibition decision. MCI brought an annulment action. The Commission invoked the lack of interest 
to act on the part of the applicant. The CFI considered that “In the present case, the disappearance of the 
contractual basis for the merger transaction, following the notifying parties' abandonment of the proposed 
merger, cannot therefore in itself preclude judicial review of the contested decision”. See Case T-310/00, MCI 
Inc. v. Commission, not yet reported at para. 49. 
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employment or company law), it follows that the principles governing the admissibility of 
annulment actions should impede these types of actions.93 In CE Société Générale des 
grandes sources Perrier,94 a case whereby several trade unions had brought an annulment 
action against a Commission decision authorising, with conditions, the takeover of Perrier by 
Nestlé,95 the CFI declared such action inadmissible. It, however, relied on the conditions 
found in Article 230 EC rather than declaring the appeal inadmissible on the basis that there 
was a lack of interest to act. The CFI acknowledged that the Commission’s decision 
“individually” concerned these trade unions. It refused to admit, however, that the 
Commission decision concerned them “directly”. The CFI held that the alleged fall in 
employment was not a result of the Commission decision but of subsequent “autonomous and 
hypothetical” interventions of the undertakings concerned. The CFI therefore limited the 
admissibility of an appeal on the basis of simple verification of whether the procedural 
guarantees accorded to applicants by the rules governing the administrative procedure were 
ignored or not. 
 
Second, the shareholders of an undertaking sometimes seek to impede the carrying out of a 
planned merger as it could reduce the scope of their powers. In the Zunis Holding case, three 
minority shareholders of Generali wished to obtain the annulment of a Commission letter 
confirming that the operation, by which Mediobanca increased its interest in Generali, did not 
constitute a concentration.96 In the particular case, the minority shareholders sought to prevent 
another shareholder from increasing its interest in the capital. Their annulment action was 
brought for reasons having nothing to do with any potential harm that could have been caused 
to the structure of competition and – for reasons analogous to those developed above – their 
appeal was declared inadmissible. The CFI held that “the mere fact that an act may affect the 
relations between the different shareholders of a company does not of itself mean that any 
individual shareholder can be regarded as directly and individually concerned by that 
measure”.97 
 
These solutions should be welcomed in view of the results they achieve. It would, however, 
have been simpler and more analytically rigorous to refuse applicants’ access to the court on 
the basis that they did not have an interest to act. It is thus suggested that both the CFI and the 
ECJ would in fact gain from systematically examining the condition of having an interest to 
act on the basis of the competition rules, rather than entering into unnecessary complex 
discussions over whether the conditions of “direct” and “individual” concern are met. This 
suggested approach would be analogous to the requirement traditionally imposed by US 
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 See contra G. Vandersanden, “Pour un élargissement du droit des particuliers d’agir en annulation contre des 
actes autres que les décisions qui leur sont adressées”, (1995) 5-6 Cahiers de Droit Européen 539-540 and P. 
Duffy, supra note 2, who enthusiastically welcomed the broadening of Article 230 EC to cover these types of 
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 See Commission decision of 22 July 1992, Nestlé/Perrier, (1992) L 356. The Commission obtained from 
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 See Case T-83/92, Zunis Holding and others v. Commission, [1993] E.C.R. II-1169. 
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federal Courts that applicants wishing to challenge an antitrust law decision establish proof of 
an “antitrust injury”.98 
 
The simple fact that an individual has an interest to act does not necessarily mean, however, 
that it is desirable from the point of view of public policy that he act. As denounced by some 
renowned US scholars, competitors (whose interest to act is often presumed) may be tempted 
to use the paths of appeal provided in US antitrust law to reduce competition in the market.99 
Firms could indeed seek to invoke antitrust law violations to neutralize the efficiency gains 
resulting from a merger between competitors or to protect themselves from competitors’ 
aggressive pricing behaviour.100 This issue has a special significance in American law, insofar 
as private actions are the most important tool in the implementation of the antitrust rules. 
 
In the EU, the question of annulment actions brought by competitors equally presents an 
interest insofar as it could also be argued that a too a great broadening of the scope of the 
conditions of admissibility to bring annulment actions would also allow undertakings to harm 
competitors by challenging Commission decisions for anti-competitive reasons. The current 
case-law seems to have dealt with this difficulty through relying on the conditions of direct 
and individual concern to block this form of unwanted litigation. It has also laid down the 
principle that the simple fact of being in a competitive relationship with the addressee of the 
act is not enough to give someone the capacity to act.101  
 
It does not however seem to be opportune to restrict competitors’ access to the courts for the 
above mentioned reasons. Indeed, unlike appeals brought by trade unions or minority 
shareholders whose objectives are obviously abusive, the question of whether a competitor’s 
appeal is abusive involves an examination, when deciding on admissibility, of questions of 
substance in order to determine if, for example, an aggressive pricing policy is the result of 
greater economic efficiency, or the result of an anti-competitive strategy of predation. This 
would in fact lead to confusing the question of whether the claim is well-founded with the 
question of whether or not it is admissible. In accordance with Community case-law, it is 
preferable to maintain broad access for competitors to bring an annulment action. 
 
2. Acts of a general nature 
 
The ratio legis of Article 230 EC is to deny individual applicants the ability to bring an 
annulment action against acts of a general nature unless the act in question is a regulation 
disguising a decision.102 The restrictive nature of this principle is based on the idea that it is 
not appropriate, for public policy reasons, that a normative act be hindered by appeals on the 
part of individuals.103 Moreover, the ECJ has adjudged such a limitation reasonable insofar as 
individuals are always able to challenge the illegality of a Regulation by pleading its illegality 
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 See Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429, U.S. 477 (1977) at 489. 
99
 Notably R. Posner, F. Easterbrook, W. Baumol and J. Ordover, cited in E. Snyder and T. Kauper, “Misuse of 




 Joined cases C-10 and 18-68, Società “Eridania” Zuccherifici Nazionali and others v. Commission, [1969] 
E.C.R. 459. 
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 The case-law has extended this exception to directives. See Case C-10/95, Asocarne, [1995] E.C.R. I-4149. 
But challenging directives poses problems from the point of view of “direct” concern insofar as they do not 
enjoy horizontal direct effect. See D. Simon, supra note 9 pp. 530-531. 
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 See C. Harding, “The Private Interest in Challenging Community Action”, (1992) 5 E.L.R. 354 
 18 
incidentally on the basis of Article 241 EC, or through the preliminary reference procedure on 
the basis of Article 234 EC.104 
 
Numerous commentators have expressed reservations about the fact that the restriction of 
individual applicants’ capacity to act against acts of a general nature could deny them 
effective legal protection.105 We concur with this view. Indeed, the last decade has seen the 
proliferation, on the Commission’s initiative, of general acts known as soft law which come in 
the form of notices and guidelines. These acts do not always limit themselves to codifying the 
Commission’s decisional practice but sometimes lay down new legal principles.106 The 
Commission moreover seems to regard them as instruments having binding legal force.107 
 
In France v. Commission, the ECJ acknowledged that notices are challengeable when they 
seek to produce legal effects by adding to the law.108 However, an appeal against these acts is 
only open to privileged applicants. In accordance with steady and constant case-law, 
individual applicants are not likely to be affected “individually” by an act of a general nature 
that does not seek to address particular parties. This situation is open to criticism for several 
reasons. First, putting aside the field of State aid, notices adopted in the field of competition 
law are exclusively addressed to economic operators whose behaviour is covered by Articles 
81 and 82 EC or by the merger regulation. The likelihood that Member States or other EU 
institutions would appeal against these acts is therefore low. Consequently, there is a risk that 
these notices would be, de facto, shielded from legal control by the Community Courts with 
the attendant risk that the Commission could take advantage of this to deliberately extend its 
own powers of control. 
 
Second, the limits laid down in the Treaty appear stricter than those imposed by the rules 
governing the annulment of administrative acts in national law. French administrative law, for 
instance, acknowledges the possibility for someone wishing to go to court to challenge every 
administrative act affecting its legal situation including acts of a general nature.109 The person 
wishing to go to court only has to prove he has a sufficient personal interest to do so.110 A 
good example is provided in the field of tax law where an appeal for ultra vires allows 
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 See Case 50/00 P, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. Council, [2000] E.C.R. I-6677. 
105
 The implementation of Article 234 or Article 241 demands, on the part of the applicant, an infringement of 
the regulation, in order to subsequently invoke illegality. This is problematic for the following reasons. First, it 
seems rather odd that the only way for an applicant to challenge a regulation is by first violating it. Second, these 
restrictions on the ability of individuals to challenge general acts seems incompatible with Article 6 (1) of the 
Convention on Human Rights. Finally, this seems to clash with the objective of promoting citizens’ rights since 
the Maastricht Treaty. See notably, D. Waelbroeck, “Le droit au recours juridictionnel effectif du particulier – 
Trois pas en avant, deux pas en arrière”, (2002) 1-2 Cahiers de Droit Européen 3 ; G. Vandersanden, supra note 
93; D. Waelbroeck and A.-M Verheyden, “Les conditions de recevabilité des recours en annulation des 
particuliers contre les actes normatifs communautaires à la lumière du droit comparé et de la Convention des 
droits de l’homme”, (1995) 3-4 Cahiers de Droit Européen 399; A. Arnull, “Private Applicants and the Action 
for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty”, (1995) C.M.L.R. 7 
106
 See I. Forrester, “Modernisation: an extension of the powers of the Commission?”, in D. Geradin, ed., supra 
note 3 at pp. 87-88. See, for example, the low thresholds fixed by the Commission guidelines on the effect on 
trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, (2004 O.J. C 101/81 at paras. 52-53) which pose a 
double negative and positive presumption of effect on trade and thus extend the field of application of 




 See Case C-325/91, France v. Commission, supra note 22.  The formal non binding nature of these acts does 
not exclude them from falling under Article 230EC.  
109
 See, for example, Conseil d’Etat, 29 January 1954, Institution Notre-Dame-du-Kreisker.  
110
 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, Droit Administratif, 17th ed. Dalloz, 1998, P. Lewalle, Contentieux Administratif, 
Ed. Collection Scientifique de la Faculté de Droit de Liège, 1997 at para. 293. 
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individuals to challenge the legality of simple circulars sent around by the tax administration. 
In principle these circulars must limit themselves to interpreting the tax rule. In practice, 
however, the public authorities merrily transgress this principle by adopting circulars of a 
statutory nature which add to the tax regulations by laying down conditions in relation to tax 
liability that are not envisaged by the core texts. The principles of Member State 
administrative laws plead therefore for an opening up, in favour of individuals, of annulment 
proceedings against acts of a general nature.111 
 
Third, potential immunity from litigation for notices is all the more shocking given that the 
Treaty does not grant the Commission the competence to define new and general legal norms 
through a notice. It becomes unacceptable when the Commission uses this instrument to 
modify principles sanctioned by the ECJ when applying the Treaty rules. Such excesses have 
been found in the six Commission notices adopted after the entry into force of Regulation 
1/2003.112 
 
Finally, just as some commentators have observed, there is a paradox in acknowledging on 
the one hand that interested parties, more often than not undertakings and consumers, are 
affected by texts that are in the pipeline and should therefore be consulted at the time of their 
elaboration and on the other hand objecting to the fact that these same parties are directly and 
individually concerned by these texts once they want to challenge them before the 
Community Courts.113 
 
These diverse arguments have been well received by the authors of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. Article III-365(4) which would replace the current Article 230 (4) 
EC envisages that: 
 
“Any natural or legal person may [...] institute proceedings against an act addressed to that 
person or which is of direct and individual concern to him or her, and against a regulatory act 
which is of direct concern to him or her and does not entail implementing measures”. 
 
The new formulation proposed by the draft constitutional treaty allows all individual 
applicants to request the annulment of a general act without proving that he is individually 
concerned by it. In the field of competition law, economic operators could thus challenge the 
legality of notices and guidelines adopted by the Commission before the CFI. Moreover, it 
should become possible to challenge certain types of decision created by Regulation 1/2003, 
such as findings of inapplicability, which could be analysed in the same way as general 
decisions, insofar as they are not taken within the framework of individual proceedings but on 
the Commission’s initiative in order to clarify the principles applicable in a sector as a whole. 
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 This tendency seems to be common to the vast majority of Member States. See D. Waelbroeck and A.-M. 
Verheyden, supra note 105 at p. 425. 
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 One can find many extensions, omissions and violations of the principles laid down in the case-law and in 
secondary law. See I. Forrester, supra note 106. See also the complete review carried out by Frank Montag and 
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Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, [1966] E.C.R. 299 at p.348. 
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 See P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd. ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003, at p. 516. 
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IV.  The modalities of an annulment action 
 
The reforms stemming from the modernisation process have not affected the rules governing 
the conditions for bringing an annulment action. The applicable rules follow the same 
principles which pertain to all matters concerning EU law. It is, however, useful to recall the 
fundamental principles applicable when bringing an appeal (1) as well as their substance (2). 
 
1. Lodging an appeal 
 
An appeal must be brought within two months following the publication of an act, its 
notification to the applicant or, failing that, the day he became aware of it.114 It may be 
brought in any official language of the Community. The applicant must be represented by a 
lawyer able to practise within the jurisdiction of a Member State or EEA State.115 Any person 
establishing an interest in the result of a case submitted to the Community Courts may 
intervene in this litigation.116 This possibility has been frequently used in competition 
litigation by competitors of the addressee of a decision,117 inter-professional associations of 
undertakings,118 client and user associations,119 consumers,120 workers’ representatives 
through their works council,121 and the consultative Commissions of the different bars within 
the EU,122 etc. 
 
In accordance with Article 242 EC, the bringing of an annulment action does not engender 
suspensive effects. A safety valve has, however, been catered for by the Treaty which allows 
the Community Courts to order a stay of execution or interim measures. The stay of execution 
does not necessarily cover the whole of the challenged act but may be limited to certain 
aspects, such as, for example commitments entered into by the parties to a concentration.123 
 
2. The content of an appeal 
 
The annulment action must mention all the points of law and fact that the applicant wishes to 
invoke.124 The initial appeal “binds the litigation”, that is to say that it is no longer possible to 
raise new arguments while legal proceedings are pending, unless new points of fact and law 
appear during the written procedure.125 
                                                 
114
 See Article 230 (5) EC. Additional time-limits are granted to those applicants who are geographically far 
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 See Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. 
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den Bergh Foods Ltd. v. Commission, 23 October 2003, not yet reported. 
118
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 Case T-191/98, Atlantic Container Line AB v. Commission, 30 September 2003, not yet reported. 
120
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123
 See Articles 242 and 243 EC. See, for example, Case T-88/94, Société commerciale des potasses et de l’azote 
et Entreprise minière et chimique v. Commission, [1994] E.C.R. II-401. See, for a recent example of a request in 
this sense, Order of the President of the CFI; T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, not yet reported. 
124
 An appellant is not justified to request the annulment of the whole decision but only those parts which have a 
direct and individual effect.  
125
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Article 230 (2) EC prescribes four “grounds for review” with reference to the different forms 
of illegality whose finding by the Community Courts leads to the annulment of the challenged 
measure: “lack of competence”, “infringement of an essential procedural requirement”, 
“infringement of th[e] Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application or “misuse of 
powers”.126 This old classification, which finds its origins in French administrative law, is 
sometimes criticised for a lack of the watertightness of each “ground of review”.127 Thus, for 
example, the insufficient reasoning of a Commission decision constitutes both an 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement and an infringement of the Treaty insofar 
as Article 253 EC requires the Commission to reason its decisions. The classification found in 
the Treaty remains useful, however, since besides its illustrative usefulness, the different 
grounds of annulment in an annulment action engender different legal effects. There is a 
classic distinction between those grounds for annulment which relate to “external legality” 
and which the Community Courts can raise on their own motion (2.1) and those grounds of 
review which relate to “internal legality” and which the Community Courts cannot raise on 
their own motion (2.2).  
 
2.1. Grounds of external legality 
 
Lack of competence is the first ground of external legality. This involves a defect which 
annuls an act because the institution that adopted it did not have the legal power to do so.128 
The Community Courts can raise this ground of annulment on their own motion, even if the 
parties have not done so in their appeal. In competition law, the lack of competence ground 
has only rarely been raised. This defect has been invoked in two types of circumstances, 
however. First, applicants have invoked a lack of competence ratione personae by the 
authority from which the act emanated. In AKZO, the undertakings thus challenged the 
possibility for the Competition Commissioner to take decisions ordering checks in accordance 
with an authorisation granted to him by the College of Commissioners.129 Second, applicants 
have invoked the Commission’s lack of competence ratione loci. In Gencor, the parties 
sought to challenge the Commission’s power to rule on merger operations between 
undertakings essentially active outside the European Community.130 
 
Infringement of an essential procedural requirement is the second ground of external legality. 
It is frequently invoked in EC competition law. It involves a defect resulting from a 
misappreciation of the rules which govern both the procedure as well as the form for each act. 
In the same way as the defect pertaining to a lack of competence, the Community Courts can 
raise this ground on their own initiative. The Community Courts are competent to determine if 
a procedural requirement is essential or not. An infringement of a duty to consult is generally 
considered as an infringement of an essential procedural requirement.131 This finding could be 
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 See C. Kerse and N. Kahn, supra note 2 at para. 8.037; L. Ritter and D. Braun, supra note 20. 
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transposed to duties to consult the consultative committee in relation to agreements and 
abuses of a dominant position envisaged in Article 14 of Regulation 1/2003. An infringement 
of the rights of the defence and, especially, the duty, as envisaged in Article 27 of Regulation 
1/2003 to allow the parties concerned (by a decision) to make observations also constitute an 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement.132 
 
In general, the Community Courts have sought to avoid drawing too radical consequences 
from a finding of annulment due to the infringement of an essential procedural requirement.133 
The Community Courts have thus strived not to annul an act in case of irregularity. 
Annulment ensues only if, in the absence of irregularity, the administrative procedure would 
have ended in a different result.134 
 
2.2. Grounds of internal legality 
 
The first ground of internal legality consists in an infringement of “th[e] Treaty or of any rule 
of law relating to its application”. In competition law, this defect relates to the infringement 
by the Commission of the Treaty competition rules, secondary legislation or general 
principles of Community law (proportionality etc).135 In practice, this ground for annulment is 
invoked when the Commission commits errors of law or when it erroneously assesses the 
facts to which it applies the law. Examples abound in the case-law in relation to this ground 
for review. 
 
Misuse of powers is the second ground of internal legality. It involves a defect by which the 
public authority exercises a power to achieve an end that is foreign to what the power 
attributed to it aims at.136 Insofar as the Commission enjoys extensive powers to implement 
competition policy and insofar as this defect is, in practice, often closely related to a problem 
of competence, the misuse of powers ground has never been successfully invoked.137 
 
 
V.  Judicial actions parallel and subsequent to Article 230 proceedings 
 
Once the Community Courts have been made aware of a legal defect, the holding of 
annulment leads directly to the nullity of the challenged act in accordance with Article 231 
EC.138 Yet, in competition law litigation, the annulment of the act is becoming less and less 
the only and sole goal sought by the applicant. Litigants are increasingly seeking to obtain, in 
parallel, a revision of the sanction imposed on them through lodging an appeal where the 
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Community Courts have “full jurisdiction” (1). Moreover, one of the repercussions of a 
finding of annulment is that applicants attempt to hold the Community responsible and obtain 
compensatory damages from the Community Courts (2). 
 
1. Increased parallel appeals where the Community Courts have full jurisdiction 
 
The last decade is characterised by a marked strengthening in the Commission’s stance in the 
field of fines.139 The levying of record fines is becoming more and more frequent, with the 
Microsoft decision representing a glaring example.140 The response to this stiffened resolve in 
the Commission’s sanctioning policy comes in the form of litigation, where litigants are 
increasingly bringing, in parallel with an annulment action, appeals in line with the Court’s 
unlimited jurisdiction under Article 229 EC and the regulations adopted for its application. 
These provisions lay down that the Court may “cancel, reduce or increase the fine or periodic 
penalty imposed”.141 
 
Until now, the CFI has exercised its control with moderation. The CFI does not repeat the 
whole assessment process. It essentially restrains itself to assessing whether the factors linked 
to duration and gravity, leniency and methodology have been correctly applied.142 The 
implementation of these principles has, however, allowed the CFI to substantially reduce the 
fines imposed by the Commission on some occasions. On the other hand, the CFI has never 
revised a fine upwards.143 A doctrinal debate has emerged on this point. Professors 
Waelbroeck and Frignani, amongst others, are of the view that to revise a fine upwards would 
be contrary to the principle by which a judge cannot give a ruling ultra petita.144 Insofar as an 
appeal to revise a fine is brought by the undertaking being sanctioned, any increase in the fine 
would involve giving a ruling on points that the applicant did not raise. 
 
It does not seem, however, desirable to exclude the possibility for the CFI to revise a fine 
upwards.145 There are three reasons for this. First, in terms of the law, the power to do so is 
expressly acknowledged by the Treaty as well as in various Council implementing regulations 
adopted in the field of competition law.146 Second, the philosophy behind the Court’s full 
jurisdiction as conceived in administrative law requires that the judge has unlimited 
jurisdiction, meaning that he should be bestowed with an unfettered power to assess the facts 
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and the law. In the case in which the Court exercises its power to re-qualify the facts, it is not 
inconceivable that the Court should hold that a Commission finding that a violation was e.g. 
of a “serious” nature should instead be regarded as a “very serious” violation of the 
competition rules. It would therefore at the very least be strange to prohibit the Court from 
drawing any consequences from such a finding by refusing it the power to increase the fine. 
Finally, and wholly appropriately, allowing for the risk that there could be an increase in a 
fine which a litigant is challenging would without doubt stem the tide of litigation before the 
Luxemburg courts. Only the most well-founded appeals would as a result be lodged before the 
Courts. 
 
These arguments have been acknowledged by the CFI who confirmed, in its April 2004 
judgment in the Graphite Electrodes case, that:  
 
“[...] the Court none the less has [...] unlimited jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 229 
EC in actions brought against the decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine and may 
therefore cancel, reduce or increase the fine imposed (emphasis added)”.147 
 
2.  Appeals for indemnity 
 
The virulence of the passages formulated by the CFI in its Airtours, Schneider and Tetra 
Laval annulment judgments and the drastic consequences resulting from the Commission’s 
prohibition decisions (abandonment of the merger transactions in question) forcefully brings 
to the fore the question of whether the Community competition authority can be held non-
contractually liable vis-à-vis those wishing to bring proceedings against it.148 In European 
law, the bringing into play of an institution’s non-contractual liability is possible in 
accordance with Article 288 EC.149 An applicant can theoretically therefore lodge an appeal 
seeking to find the Community liable when a decision of the Commission in the field of 
competition law has had a detrimental impact on him in some way. This could, for example, 
be the case if the Commission has acted illegally by wrongly prohibiting a conduct or a 
concentration between undertakings.  
 
Three conditions must be met for such a finding. First, the relevant institution must have 
committed a sufficiently serious breach of a legal rule designed to confer rights on 
individuals.150 The assessment of the factor “sufficiently serious breach” must be carried out 
in the light of two parameters. On the one hand it depends on the margin of appreciation of 
the institution in question and on the other it depends on the complexity of the situation under 
consideration. Following a sliding-scale model, the greater the margin of appreciation is the 
more serious the illegality must be.151 Second, the applicant must have suffered real and 
definite harm. In line with classic tort law principles, the harm may consist in a damnum 
emergens (material damage) or a lucrum cessans (loss of profits).  In principle, the burden of 
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proving the actual damage in figures rests on the applicant. The Court sometimes 
acknowledges however, in special circumstances, that that the harm cannot be put into precise 
figures.152 The applicant must, however, provide the Court with a reliable estimation of what 
the figure is.153 Finally, the applicant must prove that there is a direct and immediate causal 
link between the damage and the act of the institution. 
 
Scholars have not shown much interest with respect to the question of the bringing into play 
of the non-contractual liability of the Commission in the field of competition law. This 
reflects the lack of jurisprudence on the subject. To date no appeal claiming the non-
contractual liability of the Commission has succeeded. The reason for this is that the three 
conditions laid down in the case-law are very difficult to satisfy. Holcim v. Commission 
amply demonstrates this.154 In this case the Commission fined various undertakings in its 
Cement decision for operating a cartel.155 The decision eventually came before the CFI. The 
latter partially annulled the Commission’s decision as a result of finding that two 
undertakings, Alsen and Nordcement, had not violated Article 81 EC. These undertakings, 
which had given bank guarantees in order not to pay the relevant fine immediately, requested 
the Commission to reimburse the fees paid relating to bank guarantees. After their request was 
rejected by the Commission, the undertakings (which in the meantime had merged giving rise 
to a new undertaking Holcim) lodged a fresh appeal for indemnity before the CFI. They 
claimed that the illegal Commission decision caused them harm through having to pay bank 
fees. 
 
The CFI carried out an examination to see if the above three conditions had been fulfilled. It 
considered that the first condition was not satisfied insofar as: 
 
“regard being had to the fact that Cement was a particularly complex case, involving a very 
large number of undertakings and almost the entire European cement industry, to the fact 
that the structure of Cembureau made the investigation difficult owing to the existence of 
direct and indirect members, and to the fact that it was necessary to analyse a great number 
of documents, including in the applicant's specific situation, it must be held that the 
defendant was faced with complex situations to be regulated. Last, it is necessary to take 
account of the difficulties in applying the provisions of the EC Treaty in matters relating to 
cartels. Those practical difficulties were all the greater because the factual elements of the 
case in question, including in the part of the decision concerning the applicant, were 
numerous. On all of those grounds, it must be held that the breach of Community law found 
in the Cement judgment as regards the part of the decision concerning the applicant is not 
sufficiently serious”. 
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The appeal was therefore rejected.156 These grounds reveal the extreme caution in the 
Court’s approach when dealing with litigation relating to economic torts and, in particular, 
with litigation in the competition law field. Furthermore, in insisting on the difficulties of 
applying the provisions of the Treaty in the field of agreements (which are amongst some of 
the most clear and precise rules in the field of competition law), the CFI casts serious 
doubts on the possibility to successfully lodge an appeal for indemnity against an illegal 
Commission intervention in a field as technical and speculative as, for example, merger 
control. Such considerations have in no way, however, dissuaded litigants from bringing an 
appeal, on the basis of Article 288 EC, in order to find the Community liable in the field of 
merger control. The harshness of the CFI’s wording in Airtours v. Commission and 
Schneider Electric v. Commission led the parties to an unscrambled merger to lodge an 
appeal for indemnity on the basis of Article 288 EC.157  
 
It would seem that the Court’s cautious approach is justified. First, as the Court recalled in 
relation to the legislative action of the European institutions in HNL, a too greater 
broadening of the scope of the appeals for indemnity procedure could excessively hinder 
the Commission’s task of protecting the general interest of the Community.158 Admittedly, 
the recent work carried out on good governance shows that it is imperative that the 
Commission becomes increasingly liable for its actions.159 However, in the field of 
competition law, the annulment of an erroneous decision seems to be an adequate and 
sufficient mechanism to discipline the Commission.  The Commission’s recent internal 
administrative reforms which followed the three annulment judgments in Airtours, 
Schneider and Tetra Laval bear testimony to the influence of the Court’s control of the 
legality of acts of the Community institutions.160 
 
Second, the issue of imputing harm to the action of the Commission is a delicate one. In its 
appeal for indemnity lodged following the Airtours judgment, MyTravel (formerly 
Airtours) claimed compensation as it was not able to appropriate the profits made by the 
target undertaking after the Commission’s decision. If the operation had not been 
prohibited, these profits would have flowed to the acquiring undertaking. This line of 
argumentation is, however, entirely speculative. The target undertaking’s profits that 
MyTravel would allegedly have appropriated had the merger not been prohibited may 
equally have originated from an independent commercial strategy that the target would not 
have pursued had the operation been authorized. 
 
Finally, it would seem that the assessment of the economic harm caused to an applicant as a 
result of an infringement of the competition rules is, to say the least, an extremely complex 
exercise. For instance, in its appeal for compensation, MyTravel claimed “the loss of 
synergy costs savings that would have been obtained in consequence of the merger”.161 
Practitioners in the field of competition law unanimously agree, however, on the difficulty 
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VI.  The effectiveness of an annulment action 
 
Once an annulment action has been brought, its effectiveness is inextricably linked to the 
intensity of the Court’s review, that is to say the extent of the review carried out by the 
Court of the Commission’s decision (1). It equally depends on the effectiveness of the 
review from the point of view of its expedience (2). Even in the period after the 
modernisation process, it is still not certain whether the Courts are sufficiently equipped to 
to effectively deal with annulment actions relating to infringements of the competition 
rules. The question of what alternatives there are to the review system is therefore posed 
(3).  
 
1. Intensity of judicial review 
 
The growing role of economic analysis inherent to the recent reforms has meant that 
competition law has become so technical that there is a worry that the CFI, in its role as a 
generalist Court, may not be in a position to exercise a thorough review of the legality of an 
act in cases put before it. This development could result in an increase in the discretionary 
powers of the Commission.163 
 
The Community Courts have, however, shown themselves to be anxious to reaffirm the 
scope of the principle of judicial review of Commission decisions within the framework of 
Article 230 EC (1.1). In practice, more frequent recourse to outside expertise would 
certainly assist the Community Courts in exercising more extensive review of complex 
economic arguments put forward by the parties (1.2). 
 
1.1. The scope of judicial review by the CFI 
 
Drawing inspiration from principles found in French administrative law, the ECJ was 
reticent, in the initial years of the implementation of competition law, to exercise its review 
of Commission decisions beyond an assessment of errors of law or manifest errors of 
appraisal that the latter may have committed in its analysis of a supposedly anti-competitive 
practice. The ECJ thus held in Remia: 
 
“The Court must therefore limit its review of such an appraisal to verifying whether the 
relevant procedural rules have been complied with, whether the statement of the reasons for 
the decision is adequate, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there 
has been any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers”.164 
 
This jurisprudence was equally continued in Matra/Hachette where the CFI recalled that: 
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“judicial review of the legal characterization of the facts is limited to the possibility of the 
Commission having committed a manifest error of assessment”.165 
 
Notwithstanding this restrictive statement both the CFI and ECJ were, in fact, prepared to 
undertake a thorough examination of the Commission’s analyses (including the facts, their 
assessment and their qualification), as is witnessed by the Woodpulp case where the ECJ 
verified whether the alignment of prices identified by the Commission in its decision could 
be explained by economic circumstances unrelated to a concerted practice forbidden by 
Article 81 EC.166 
 
Following the entry into force of the Merger Control Regulation, the question of the scope 
of judicial review was further discussed. In Kali und Salz, the ECJ seemed to refuse to 
undertake a thorough analysis of the economic analysis carried out by the Commission as 
the Merger Control Regulation was deemed to confer on the latter a “certain discretion, 
especially with respect to assessments of an economic nature” which the Courts had to 
respect.167 
 
Within this context, the three annulment judgments handed down by the CFI in Airtours, 
Schneider Electric and Tetra Laval could be interpreted as an encroachment on the margin 
of discretion attributed to the Commission by the regulation. In its appeal against the CFI’s 
Tetra Laval judgment, the Commission criticized the CFI for having exceeded the standard 
laid down by the ECJ in Kali und Salz by examining the Commission’s economic analysis 
too closely.168 The case gave rise to an interesting exchange of views on the principles 
governing the scope of judicial review. In his conclusions, Advocate-General Tizzano 
partially supported the Commission’s position.  
 
"The rules on the division of powers between the Commission and the Community 
judicature, which are fundamental to the Community institutional system, do not however 
allow the judicature to go further, and particularly – as I have just said – to enter into the 
merits of the Commission’s complex economic assessments or to substitute its own point of 
view for that of the institution (emphasis added).169 
 
After a both tortuous and sometimes obscure reasoning, the ECJ settled the difference in 
opinion by holding that: 
 
“Whilst the Court recognises that the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to 
economic matters, that does not mean that the Community Courts must refrain from reviewing 
the Commission's interpretation of information of an economic nature. Not only must the 
Community Courts, inter alia, establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, 
reliable and consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must 
be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn from it. Such a review is all the more necessary in the 
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case of a prospective analysis required when examining a planned merger with conglomerate 
effect”.170 
 
The ECJ considers therefore that the scope of judicial review carried out by the CFI 
encompasses an evaluation of any given economic data within the confines of an examination 
of their veracity, their relevance and their coherence. This solution should be positively 
welcomed. First, it reduces the risk that the competition authority will succumb to 
arbitrariness and stray away from its assigned duty. This objective is all the more urgent given 
that the economic theories currently used by competition authorities are often malleable 
instruments which can conceal, while simulating analytical rigour, purely opportunistic goals. 
Further this solution also assures the parties that there will be a real review of their legal 
situation, in line with the principle laid down by the European Court of Human Rights which 
requires that everyone have the right to appeal. 
 
1.2. Recourse to outside expertise when dealing with matters of an economic nature 
 
The growing technical nature of the economic arguments put forward by parties in 
competition law litigation complicates the Court’s mission to such an extent that it sometimes 
may prefer to hold back from examining whether the theories advanced by the parties are 
well-grounded. Admittedly, we have just seen that the Court pronounced itself in favour of a 
control of any given economic arguments put forward by the parties. In order to ensure that 
this jurisprudence does not remain a de facto declaration of intention, we consider that more 
frequent recourse to outside experts could usefully assist the Court in carrying out this 
delicate mission.  
 
Article 70 of the CFI’s Rules of Procedure allows the CFI to order third party expertise. An 
independent expert operating under the control of the Court reporter can be nominated. He 
compiles an expert report covering all the points asked of him. Within the field of competition 
law, the Court has only sparingly used outside expertise. The Woodpulp case represents a rare 
example.171 The ECJ ordered two expert evaluations on the question of whether the structure 
of the woodpulp market inevitably led to price harmonization through parallel behaviour or to 
different prices. The Court explicitly relied on the experts’ reports in order to conclude that 
the parallel behaviour observed on the woodpulp market could not be explained by 
concertation as the Commission had found, but could be satisfactorily explained by the 
oligopolistic nature of the market.172 
 
The infrequency of the CFI’s recourse to outside expertise contrasts with the growing 
tendency for parties before the Commission or CFI to employ outside expertise.173 This 
development makes it all the more pressing for the CFI to nominate independent experts able 
to arbitrate on the often opposing views of the experts in economics employed by the parties 
in competition law case. Otherwise, the CFI may, in cases involving complex economic 
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2. The expedience of judicial review 
 
The swiftness (or lack of) of annulment proceedings before the CFI has for a long time now 
been the subject of criticism, in particular in the field of merger control. Intervening on 
average 21 months after a Commission decision, an eventual judgment annulling a 
Commission decision prohibiting a merger was devoid of all practical effect insofar as very 
few undertakings were prepared to wait so long in order to implement a merger which was 
wrongly prohibited. 
 
In these conditions Article 230 EC annulment proceedings were to a large extent devoid of all 
practical effect in the field merger control. This situation was all the more untenable as it 
bestowed a de facto power on the part of the Commission to decide on the life or death of a 
merger. Had a Commission decision been annulled, an operation would still not have gone 
ahead. Admittedly, prohibition decisions were rare.174 However, the Commission made 
extensive use of the threat of a prohibition in order to extract substantial commitments from 
the merging parties. 
 
In order to effectively ameliorate the effectiveness of its control of Commission decisions in 
this field, the CFI’s Rules of Procedure were amended in December 2000 so as to introduce 
an expedited procedure.175 Article 76 states: 
 
 “The Court of First Instance may, on application by the applicant or the defendant, after 
hearing the other parties and the Advocate General, decide, having regard to the particular 
urgency and the circumstances of the case, to adjudicate under the expedited procedure”. 
 
Within the framework of merger control, a request for the use of the expedited procedure 
must come from one of the applicants (the parties to the merger or a third-party), or from the 
defendant, in this case the Commission.176 They must reason their request, i.e. they must show 
in what way the case is urgent. Further, in order that the request be taken into consideration, 
they have to ensure that their statement of case is only a summary of the grounds invoked and 
includes a limited number of annexes.177 
 
The CFI has a margin of discretion when deciding whether or not to grant an expedited 
procedure. Some criteria for a rejection to grant such a procedure can be gleaned from the 
recent jurisprudence of the CFI. First of all, in Ineos Phenol v. Commission, the complexity of 
the case seemed to create an obstacle to the grant of an expedited procedure.178 Further, in 
General Electric v. Commission, the withdrawal of the merger before the lodging of the 
appeal prevented the use of the expedited procedure.179 Finally, it would seem that the Court 
is reluctant to order an expedited procedure in fields other than merger control, as is witnessed 
by Meca Medina v. Commission, where the CFI refused to grant the use of the expedited 
procedure in an appeal against a rejection of a complaint introduced under Articles 81 and 82 
EC.180 
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Once the Court has accepted the request, the case is given automatic priority. The most 
prominent characteristic of the expedited procedure is the minimal importance given to the 
written procedure, which is limited to an exchange of statements of case, in favour of an oral 
procedure.181 The parties are also given, if appropriately justified, the possibility to put 
forward fresh evidence during the oral pleadings. 
 
The rare cases in which the Court has accepted the use of the expedited procedure in merger 
control show a significant reduction in time before a judgment is handed down. Thus, in 
Schneider Electric v. Commission,182 Tetra Laval v. Commission,183 Royal Philips Electronics 
v. Commission,184 and Cableuropa and others v. Commission,185 the CFI handed down a 
judgment after between 10 and 12 months. This can be contrasted with the standard time of on 
average 20 months and more before a judgment is given. 
 
Does this mean, however, that an action for annulment following the expedited procedure is a 
panacea? Certain commentators have shown great enthusiasm for this procedure.186 We 
consider, however, that the evaluation has to be more nuanced. Even if the expedited 
procedure marks a step in the right direction, it remains, in many ways, an insufficient 
organizational expedient. First, there is good reason to believe that despite the use of this 
procedure, only a tiny amount of mergers prohibited by the Commission will be revived after 
an annulment judgment.187 Indeed, if the judgment is given after an average of 11 months, a 
further average of five months has to be added to take into account the preliminary 
administrative procedure before the Commission.188 Moreover, the re-notification of the 
merger to the Commission as well as a potential appeal by the Commission to the ECJ could 
discourage the parties from reactivating their project. These observations are borne out by the 
facts. Only the merger between Tetra Laval and Sidel was completed at the end of the 
annulment judgment of the CFI. However, in that particular case, the completion of the 
merger was not the result of the expedited procedure before the CFI, but rather the 
consequence of the fact that Tetra Laval had already implemented the purchase of the target’s 
stocks at the time of the notification.189  
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Second, the option of an expedited procedure puts the parties in a dilemma as they must 
choose between, on the one hand, the putting forward of exhaustive arguments and grounds 
for annulment; and on the other hand, recourse to less extensive argumentation in order to 
benefit from swifter action by the Court. Some have denounced this situation considering that 
it constituted a breach of the rights of the defence.190 This situation is not at all satisfactory 
because the simplification and the reduction of the grounds for annulment submitted by the 
parties do not fit well with the growing importance of increasingly technical economic 
analyses and therefore more sophisticated arguments in the field of competition law. 
 
The Commission itself seems to have acknowledged these difficulties. After having 
welcomed the adoption of the expedited procedure in its XXXIInd report on competition 
policy, it evoked the need to ensure even swifter judicial review in merger control cases.191 
The need for more rapid and effective review raises the question of which alternatives there 
are to the current Community system of judicial review. 
 
3. The alternatives to the current system of judicial review 
 
The current system of judicial review is characterized by generalist CFI judges and, 
correlatively, by the absence of a formal recognition of the intricacies of competition law 
litigation. The recent decisional practice of the Commission and the case-law of the Court 
reveal, however, the specific nature of this branch of litigation. First, the growing technicality 
of cases and in particular the major role that industrial economics plays in the field of 
competition law are increasingly isolating competition law litigation from other branches of 
European law. Second, the current backlog of pending court cases is incompatible with the 
fast-moving nature of markets, especially in the field of merger control. 
 
These characteristics raise the question whether the setting up of a specialist Court for 
competition law litigation would increase the effectiveness of judicial review. Several 
eminent commentators have recently evoked this question.192 Indeed, various reasons show 
that the setting up of a specialist court does not remain a purely academic matter. First, at the 
European level, a legal basis is foreseen to this effect by Article 220(2) of the EC Treaty: 
 
 “[...] judicial panels may be attached to the Court of First Instance under the conditions laid 
down in Article 225a in order to exercise, in certain specific areas, the judicial competence 
laid down in this Treaty”.193 
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This provision is being increasingly used to create specialised chambers. In December 2004, 
for instance, the Council decided to create a Civil Service Tribunal, able to deal with litigation 
in this matter.194 In the field of competition law, Article 220(2) has also aroused the interest of 
the European institutions. In 2002, the European Parliament, in a Resolution adopted after the 
Commission published its XXXIInd report on competition policy, evoked the possibility of 
creating a specialised judicial chamber in relation to mergers.195 The Commission answered 
the Parliament in its XXXIIIrd report by adopting a moderate position:  
 
“The Community Courts exercise a diligent and scrupulous control of the Commission’s 
enforcement actions. This concerns final decisions on the substantive assessment of major 
transactions as well as procedural questions involving undertakings’ rights of defence. The 
Community courts moreover introduced a fast-track procedure. They are also able to grant 
interim measures. The feasibility of a new judicial panel pursuant to Article 225A requires in-
depth investigation. The Court itself possibly is best placed to carry out such an assessment. 
This would reach from workload considerations (internal to the Community Courts) to 
fundamental questions of interpretation of the Treaty in particular regarding the weight to be 
attributed to the competition rules and the consequential desirability of the continuous 
development of their interpretation by the Court of Justice”.196 
 
To date, no detailed study on the feasibility of such a project has been carried out. However, 
the experience of a number of Member States which have decided to transfer litigation in 
relation to the legality of decisions from their competition authorities to specialist courts 
shows that in principle, there are no objections to a specialist court in the field of competition 
law. These states have followed various models. First and foremost, certain states like the 
United Kingdom and Denmark have instituted a specialist court in the field of competition 
law which deal with appeals against decisions adopted by the national competition 
authority.197 Further, other states like Austria, Belgium and France have instituted a specialist 
chamber within a generalist court which focuses and deals with all appeals against decisions 
of their national competition authority.198 Finally, states like Finland, have established a court 
                                                                                                                                                        
Instance”. See also Article III-359(1) of the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe: “European laws may 
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with exclusive competence to deal with economic law which is, in this connection, also able 
to deal with competition law litigation.199 
 
Second, the arguments invoked by some against the creation of specialist courts are not 
convincing.200 First and foremost, the risk that the application and interpretation of European 
law will not be uniform as a result of a proliferation of specialist courts seems illusory, insofar 
as these specialist courts are subject to a common appeal mechanism. This is the case as long 
as the mechanisms foreseen by the Treaty of Nice as well as the one envisaged by the draft 
Constitutional Treaty offer the possibility to appeal on points of law before the CFI, in its 
quality as a generalist court.201 Further, the risk that these specialist courts erroneously 
interpret constitutional questions or Community law provisions not falling within their 
competence is also limited by the appeal mechanism. Finally, the increase in costs resulting 
from the creation of new chambers reflects a misunderstanding of judicial economy. The 
current system and the modifications introduced by the Nice Treaty (transfer of civil service 
cases from the CFI to the Civil Service Tribunal) do not make it possible to eradicate the 
endemic evil that the considerable backlog of pending cases in Luxemburg represents 
(because the diversion of cases from the CFI to the Civil Service Tribunal is cancelled out by 
the transfer of all direct actions from the ECJ to the CFI).202Accordingly, the periods of time 
before a judgment is handed down should remain virtually identical. In that context, there are 
doubts that both the administrative and economic costs generated by the slowness of the 
Community judicial machine are lower than the fixed cost resulting from the creation of a 
specialist judicial chamber are justified.203 
 
Under these conditions, the appropriateness of the creation of a Community court specialised 
in competition law should be the subject of serious analysis in terms of the costs and benefits 
that it could generate. The Commission, which drew the consequences from the annulment 
judgments referred to above at the administrative level, is strongly advised to reflect more on 





The post-modernisation era forecasts new days for competition law. The substantive rules, on 
the one hand, have undergone profound change accentuating the technicality of the subject 
matter. The implementing rules, on the other hand, confer on the Commission broad powers 
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which are to be found in the new acts envisaged by Regulation 1/2003 and the various notices 
and guidelines adopted since then. 
 
In contradistinction to this development, the principles governing appeals against Commission 
acts (challengeable nature of various acts, the conditions pertaining to having an “interest” 
and “quality” to act, the conditions of an appeal procedure and the legal architecture of the 
Community) remain essentially the same or, at the most, have been the subject of only 
cosmetic modifications. 
 
The consequent discrepancy which appears between the substantial development of the 
substantive rules and the inertia of the procedural rules governing appeals is problematic from 
the point of view of the degree of judicial protection afforded to economic operators. First of 
all, real legal insecurity emerges from the obscure status of certain acts added by Regulation 
1/2003 to the Commission’s decisional normative arsenal. Further, the inefficiency of judicial 
review is blatant. Pressured by an excessive judicial backlog and faced with the increasing 
technicality of competition law litigation, generalist judges deliver rulings within excessive 
time-limits which are incompatible with the functioning of an efficient market economy.  
 
In this context it would seem necessary to think about modernising the annulment action 
procedure within the field of competition law or even reform the system of legal protection of 
individuals who fall under this law or suffer the consequences of its application. Without 
limiting itself to the field of competition law, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe defines certain contours (notably through the possibility to set up “specialist courts” or 
the broadening of the scope of the “quality to act” against acts of a general nature). This study 
attempted to offer new grounds for reflection. 
